Rules of Thumb

Is there a rule of thumb for valuing common stock relative to preferred?  If a new preferred round is priced at $1.00 per share, can we assume that the value of common is $0.10?  No.

By now, most managers of venture-backed companies understand that the old 10% rule is dead.  The AICPA Practice Aid (Valuation of Privately-Held-Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation) states “The use of ‘rules of thumb’ is not (and never has been) an appropriate method for estimating the fair value of a company’s common stock.”  Nevertheless, many managers still want to get a sense of the common stock’s value before engaging a valuation specialist.  Once the draft appraisal is completed, managers often respond by saying it doesn’t “feel” right.

The guidance is the guidance, but that doesn’t prevent us from at least asking the question:  mathematically, is there a way we can reliably estimate the value of common relative to preferred?

For an early stage company, many valuation specialists use the “backsolve” method under the OPM framework to determine the value of the common.  If the specialist knows the price paid for Series A preferred, it’s possible to use the option-pricing method (OPM) to solve for an equity value which corresponds to this price.  Not only that, the OPM allocates this equity value among the company’s equity securities.  Since the analysis relies on a mathematical model, the answer is unambiguous.  If we understand the company’s equity capital structure, we can calculate a strike price, or breakpoint, for each iteration of the OPM.  At a given level of volatility and with a given time to liquidity, the model will always generate the same value for common relative to preferred.

To illustrate, let’s assume that a company issues 5 million Series A preferred shares priced at $1.00 per share.  The Series A preferred converts to common on a one-for-one basis.  There are 10 million common shares outstanding and no options.  We’ll assume that the time to liquidity is 2 years and volatility is 60 percent.

We know that the value of Series A has to be the amount invested, $5 million.  We know that the first breakpoint in the OPM is the liquidation preference on Series A, which is also $5 million.  The second breakpoint is the equity value at which the Series A holder elects to convert to common.  This is $15 million, which is the product of the number of fully-diluted shares times the Series A price.  If the company is sold for less than $5 million, all of the proceeds are paid to Series A.  If the company is sold for more than $5 million but less than $15 million, the payout to Series A is fixed at $5 million, and common is paid the remainder.  If the company is sold for more than $15 million, one-third of the proceeds are paid to Series A and two-thirds are paid to common.

Once we load these assumptions into the OPM, it provides us with a value for the equity of $10,292,933.  The Series A has to be worth $5 million, so the common is worth $5,292,933.  How’s that for precision?  The common is worth $0.53 per share before applying a discount for lack of marketability (DLOM).  The DLOM is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it should be apparent that, even if we apply a very big DLOM, the value of common is going to be well north of 10% of the Series A price.

We may not like the answer (53% “feels” high), but at least it’s an answer.  Can we rely on our new rule of thumb?  Before doing so, it’s worth considering how changes in the features of the preferred can affect the outcome.  For example, the preferred may be entitled to a cumulative dividend or no dividend at all.  Sometimes, preferred “participates” in distributions to common after the liquidation preference has been paid.  This participation may be capped or uncapped.  How do these features affect our rule of thumb?  The following table provides the answer:

 

Preferred feature

Value of common / preferred

Plain vanilla

53%

8% cumulative dividend

37%

Participation capped at 3X

24%

Participation with no cap

23%

 

In each case, the value of the preferred is the same, but the equity value varies.  Each concession to the venture investor is a reduction in equity value.  What’s the difference in participating and non-participating preferred?  In our example, the equity value indicated by participating preferred is $7,307,406, which is 29 percent lower than the value indicated by non-participating preferred.

All of the variation in equity value is absorbed by the common.  Common value is leveraged in a venture-backed company.  A change in the equity value results in a disproportionate change in the value of the common.  In our example, a 29% decrease in equity value corresponds to a 57% decrease in the value of the common.

Bear in mind that this table, which shows wide swings in the value of common, relies on a number of simplifying assumptions.  Is it safe to assume the time to liquidity is two years, or should a longer life be assumed?  Is the volatility of an early stage company higher or lower than sixty percent?  What happens to the value of common if the preferred is priced at a premium or a discount, or if the mix of preferred and common shares is changed?

Rules of thumb never have been a good way of valuing common relative to preferred.  The features of preferred are too varied.  The value of common is too volatile.

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Pre-Money and Post-Money Confusion

Venture capitalists have a short-hand nomenclature for valuation that causes confusion for appraisers and their clients.  I’m referring to “pre-money” and “post-money” value.  Assume a company has 10 million common shares outstanding and it issues 5 million Series A convertible preferred shares priced at $1.00 each.  The pre-money value is equal to the product of the common shares outstanding times the Series A price (10,000,000 X $1.00 = $10,000,000).  The post-money value is equal to the pre-money value plus the proceeds from the issuance of Series A ($10,000,000 + $5,000,000 = $15,000,000).

So what’s the problem?  It’s that the value of the equity isn’t really $10 million.  The VC pays $5 million for Series A shares with privileges the common stock doesn’t have.  For example, the Series A preferred is entitled to a liquidation preference over the common stock.  When we multiply the Series A price times all the common-equivalent shares outstanding, we’re assuming all these shares are of equal value.  They’re not.  The common is worth less than the preferred.  Therefore, the value of the equity is something less than $10 million.

The VC pays $5 million for 33% of the equity, so the post-money value must be $15 million, right?  Wrong.  The VC is entitled to 33% of the equity if everything goes right and the preferred converts to common.  If the Company is sold at a discount to the liquidation preference, the VC’s claim on value isn’t 33%.  It’s 100%.  The VC’s investment entitles to him to no less than 33% of the company and possibly much more.

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Should We Value Intangibles? How?

Compare the balance sheets of three companies: Pacific Gas & Electric, Wal-Mart and Google.  You’ll find that the assets listed by PG&E and Wal-Mart provide a fairly accurate indicator of what these companies do.  Power plants account for more than two-thirds of PG&E’s assets.  Stores account for more than half of Wal-Mart’s assets, followed by inventory (20%).  Now take a look at Google.  Cash accounts for more than half its asset value.  Property and goodwill each provide for about ten percent of Google’s reported assets.  Is Google a bank?  Nowhere on its balance sheet does it list its proprietary technology, its customer base or its universally-recognized name.

When we talk about valuing intangible assets, we’re not talking about assigning value to a will-o’-the-wisp.  Does anyone doubt that Google’s technology is valuable?  We need to value intangible assets because the economy has changed.  Back when the U.S. depended on power plants, automobiles and steel mills, the old accounting rules worked just fine.  Now that our economy depends on companies like Google, Microsoft, and Apple, the old rules don’t work as well.

So how do we account for these assets?  Do we follow the current trend toward fair value reporting or rely on tried-and-true cost accounting?  The proponents of cost accounting claim that investment in an asset is the most reliable indicator of its value.  By this logic, R&D spending is capitalized and not expensed.  Advocates for cost accounting also argue that fair value reporting tends to undervalue intangibles.  They point to the fact that, in purchase price accounting, the largest intangible is almost always a nebulous category called goodwill.

But is cost accounting really the solution?  Consider Google again.  In the five-and-a-half years prior to its initial public offering, Google spent $234 million on R&D.  That’s a lot of money, but it’s nowhere close to the value the market assigned Google in its IPO ($23 billion).  After we account for $234 million in technology assets, what do we call the $22+ billion that’s left over?  Goodwill?

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Changes in the Value of Common Stock

One reason it’s difficult to value common stock in a venture-backed company is that the value of common is more volatile than the value of equity.  A small swing in equity value, up or down, can trigger a much bigger change in the value of common.  If we’re valuing equity based on market multiples, which change every day, the value of common is likely to bounce around.

The volatility is the result of financial leverage, the same phenomenon which contributes to higher earnings and losses in companies financed with debt.  Unless equity value is high enough to trigger conversion of preferred, the preferred liquidation preference is like debt.  Equity value may increase by a small amount, but if it all flows to common with none to preferred, the effect on common value can be dramatic.  To illustrate, assume a venture-backed company is capitalized with 1,000,000 preferred shares and 500,000 common shares.  The preferred liquidation preference is $10 per share, so the preferred won’t convert unless the equity value rises above $15 million.  Consider the effect of small changes in equity value if the value of the equity is around $10 million.

If the company is sold for $9.9 million, the liquidation preference is paid out and the value of common is zero.  If the company is sold for $10.1 million, the payout to common is $100,000, or $0.20 per share.  If the sale price is $10.2 million, the value of common is $0.40 per share.  A one percent change in equity value doubles the payout to common!

When valuing common, some appraisers will consider two equity allocation methods: the probability-weighted expected returns method (PWERM) and the option-pricing method (OPM).  I haven’t done a formal survey, but it’s my impression that OPM typically generates a higher value for the common than the PWERM.  When generating PWERM scenarios, it’s easy think of homerun scenarios (an IPO or sale) and failure scenarios.  In contrast, the OPM often assigns high probabilities to outcomes close to the liquidation preference.  These outcomes contribute to the value of the common without adding to the value of the preferred.

The problem of common volatility is apparent when one attempts to provide quarterly or semi-annual appraisals.  The most reliable data for estimating frequent changes in value comes from the public markets.  Multiples change as the markets move up or down.  Moreover, the appraiser typically relies on the multiples indicated by a handful of companies.  Suppose the appraiser relies on a group of five comparables and applies the median multiple to the company to be valued.  Now suppose one comp announces a large order in the same quarter that another announces an accounting irregularity.  Inevitably, the median multiple will get out of whack.

When appraisal textbooks stress that valuation is a matter of judgment, it’s these types of issues the authors are thinking about.  It is appropriate for the appraiser to make adjustments to smooth out inexplicable shifts in value.  Nevertheless, a quarterly sequence of accurate appraisals is likely to show something other than a smooth progression.

Unfortunately, volatility is not what most managers, investors, auditors and regulators expect to see.  Most of us expect value to climb in orderly fashion.  Management is there to build value, and if they’re doing their jobs, they should go home every night with the value a tad higher than it was when the day began.  It is easier for management, the auditors and the appraisers to tell a tale of smoothly increasing value than one in which value jumps up, falls, then shoots up again.

The appraiser performs a balancing act.  On the one hand, there is no need to assume that private company value changes with every trade in the public markets.  On the other, a boring story of steady growth is not only boring, it’s probably not accurate.

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Best Practices for Contributory Asset Charges

The Appraisal Foundation has released the first of its “best practices” guides for valuations in financial reporting.  This one addresses the issue of contributory asset charges and is available on The Appraisal Foundation’s website:

https://appraisalfoundation.sharefile.com/d/s80f9c7da9e744de9

This monograph, named “The Identification of Contributory Assets and Calculation of Economic Rents” is the work of a committee established by the Appraisal Issues Task Force (AITF).  The AITF has other committees at work which will be releasing guidance on additional topics related to valuations in financial reporting.  The goal of this effort is to reduce “diversity in practice.”

Valuing intangible assets for financial reporting is a tricky business.  Hire two well-qualified appraisers to value the same collection of assets, and it’s likely they will come up with different values.  Some diversity is unavoidable.  Valuation, after all, is a matter of judgment.  Nevertheless, the appraiser has an obligation to present a well-reasoned case that his valuation is on target.  The auditor has an obligation to ensure that the judgments are sound and the methodology correct.

Often, the auditor’s concept of “best practices” is based on the audit firm’s own established procedures.  But what happens when two audit firms have different practices?  What if the appraiser follows guidance from a published article, but the auditor disagrees with the methodology?  Who is right?

The “best practices” guides are intended to address this issue.  Each guide is the work of a group which includes representatives from the major accounting firms as well as respected valuation firms.  The guides are released in draft form for comments.  Once published in its final form, each monograph should help eliminate areas in ambiguity in valuation for financial reporting.

Practice guides offer guidance, not rules.  Nevertheless, the monograph provides a useful function by stating a preference for certain methodologies over others.  For example, should contributory asset charges (CAC) be applied for goodwill?  “The Working Group believes that assembled workforce is typically the only element of goodwill for which a CAC is taken.”  What if the acquisition is structured as a tax-deferred exchange of shares?  Does that affect the value of the assets?  “The Working Group believes that the fair value of an asset should not differ depending on the tax structure of a particular transaction.”  What if the appraiser deems two assets to be of comparable importance, values both using an excess earnings method and applies “cross charges” for CACs?  “The Working Group strongly believes that the use of simultaneous application of the MPEEM with either single or multiple cross charges to multiple intangible assets that share the same revenue/cash flow is not best practice and should be avoided.”

Not all appraisers will agree with the Working Group’s conclusions, but appraisers who follow the monograph’s guidance will have a useful tool when presenting their conclusions for audit review.

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